Legal and compliance
SkinID is subject to the Swiss Federal Act on Data Protection (nLPD). The following documents describe how we process, protect, and manage your data.
1. User identity data
| Field | Detail |
|---|---|
| Data | NFC implant UID (SHA-256 hash), user-assigned name, avatar |
| Purpose | User identification and account management |
| Legal basis | Contract performance |
| Recipients | None |
| Retention | Until account deletion |
| Security | UID stored as SHA-256 hash, HTTPS in transit, database encrypted at rest |
2. Saved credentials
| Field | Detail |
|---|---|
| Data | Website URL, username, encrypted password, type (Personal/Professional) |
| Purpose | Password management and auto-fill |
| Legal basis | Contract performance |
| Recipients | None. User-initiated sharing between SkinID accounts only. |
| Retention | Until credential or account deletion |
| Security | AES-256-GCM encryption, per-user derived keys (HKDF-SHA256) |
3. FIDO2 passkeys
| Field | Detail |
|---|---|
| Data | Relying party ID, credential ID, encrypted private key, public key, user name, sign-in count |
| Purpose | Passwordless authentication |
| Legal basis | Contract performance |
| Recipients | Public key shared with the relying party during registration |
| Retention | Until passkey or account deletion |
| Security | Private keys encrypted with AES-256-GCM, per-user derived keys |
4. Autofill profile
| Field | Detail |
|---|---|
| Data | Name, date of birth, gender, emails, phones, addresses, usernames, company, job title |
| Purpose | Auto-filling registration forms |
| Legal basis | Contract performance |
| Recipients | None. Data injected into forms locally in the browser. |
| Retention | Until profile or account deletion |
| Security | Encrypted as a single AES-256-GCM blob with per-user key |
5. Activity log
| Field | Detail |
|---|---|
| Data | Action type, detail text, timestamp |
| Purpose | Security monitoring |
| Legal basis | Legitimate interest (security) |
| Retention | 12 months |
6. Trusted devices
| Field | Detail |
|---|---|
| Data | Device name, IP address, platform, device ID, timestamps |
| Purpose | NFC bridge management |
| Legal basis | Contract performance |
| Retention | Until device removal or account deletion |
7. Authentication tokens
| Field | Detail |
|---|---|
| Data | SHA-256 hash of token, prefix, creation date, last used date |
| Purpose | Session management |
| Security | Raw tokens never stored. Only hashes persisted. |
Technical and organizational measures
- All data encrypted at rest (AES-256-GCM with per-user keys)
- All communications encrypted in transit (HTTPS with TLS certificate pinning)
- Per-user data isolation at the database level
- CSRF protection, rate limiting
- Daily automated backups (30-day retention)
- Server hosted by Infomaniak, Switzerland
- No third-party analytics, tracking, or data sharing
1. Definition
A personal data breach is any security incident that leads to accidental or unlawful destruction, loss, alteration, unauthorized disclosure of, or access to personal data.
2. Detection
- Unusual server access patterns
- Unexpected database queries or exports
- User reports of unauthorized activity
- Security researcher disclosures
- Monitoring alerts (failed authentication spikes, rate limiting triggers)
3. Assessment (within 24 hours)
- What data was affected?
- How many users are affected?
- Is the data encrypted? Was the master key compromised?
- Is the breach ongoing or contained?
- What is the risk to affected users?
4. Containment (immediately)
- Revoke all active authentication tokens
- Rotate the master encryption key if compromised
- Block unauthorized access vectors
- Take the server offline if necessary
- Preserve evidence
5. Notification to the FDPIC
As soon as possible (within 72 hours) via databreach.edoeb.admin.ch. The notification includes: nature of the breach, data affected, number of users, consequences, and measures taken.
6. Notification to affected users
Required if the breach poses a high risk to users. Users are notified via the management panel and any available contact information. The notification explains what happened, what data was affected, what the user should do, and what SkinID has done.
7. Post-incident review
Within 2 weeks: document the timeline, identify root cause, implement corrective measures, update procedures.
Contact
FDPIC: www.edoeb.admin.ch
Breach notification: databreach.edoeb.admin.ch
1. Description
SkinID is a Swiss authentication platform that uses a subdermal NFC cryptographic implant as a universal identity key. Users scan their hand to authenticate across digital and physical environments.
Data processed
- NFC implant UID (SHA-256 hash)
- Encrypted website credentials (passwords)
- Encrypted FIDO2 private keys
- Encrypted autofill profile (name, contacts, addresses)
- Activity logs, device information, sharing relationships
Data flows
User's implant → NFC reader → SkinID app/extension → HTTPS → SkinID server (Switzerland). No data flows outside Switzerland. No third-party APIs receive user data.
2. Necessity and proportionality
Each data category serves a specific functional purpose (authentication, password management, form auto-fill). No email, phone, or real name is required. SkinID collects significantly less personal data than comparable services. Data collection is proportionate.
3. Risk assessment
| Risk | Likelihood | Impact |
|---|---|---|
| Server compromise (database only) | Low | Low (data encrypted) |
| Server compromise (database + master key) | Very low | High |
| Stolen authentication token | Low | Medium |
| NFC implant cloning (DESFire EV3) | Very low | Medium |
| Cross-user data access | Very low | High |
| Data loss | Low | Medium |
4. Mitigation measures
| Measure | Status |
|---|---|
| AES-256-GCM encryption with per-user keys | Implemented |
| Master key stored separately from database | Implemented |
| SHA-256 token hashing | Implemented |
| Auto-lock after inactivity | Implemented |
| Per-user data isolation | Implemented |
| Daily automated backups | Implemented |
| DESFire EV3 AES-128 mutual authentication | Implemented |
| Migrate to implant-derived encryption keys | Planned |
| Encrypt activity log entries | Planned |
5. Conclusion
The processing is necessary and proportionate. Identified risks are mitigated by technical and organizational measures. Residual risk level: LOW. The primary residual risk (server-side master key) is accepted for the current phase and will be addressed by migrating to implant-derived encryption keys.
This assessment is reviewed annually, when significant changes are made, or after any security incident.