Legal and compliance

SkinID is subject to the Swiss Federal Act on Data Protection (nLPD). The following documents describe how we process, protect, and manage your data.

1
Record of processing activities
Art. 12 nLPD. A complete inventory of all personal data processed by SkinID, including purpose, legal basis, retention, and security measures.

1. User identity data

FieldDetail
DataNFC implant UID (SHA-256 hash), user-assigned name, avatar
PurposeUser identification and account management
Legal basisContract performance
RecipientsNone
RetentionUntil account deletion
SecurityUID stored as SHA-256 hash, HTTPS in transit, database encrypted at rest

2. Saved credentials

FieldDetail
DataWebsite URL, username, encrypted password, type (Personal/Professional)
PurposePassword management and auto-fill
Legal basisContract performance
RecipientsNone. User-initiated sharing between SkinID accounts only.
RetentionUntil credential or account deletion
SecurityAES-256-GCM encryption, per-user derived keys (HKDF-SHA256)

3. FIDO2 passkeys

FieldDetail
DataRelying party ID, credential ID, encrypted private key, public key, user name, sign-in count
PurposePasswordless authentication
Legal basisContract performance
RecipientsPublic key shared with the relying party during registration
RetentionUntil passkey or account deletion
SecurityPrivate keys encrypted with AES-256-GCM, per-user derived keys

4. Autofill profile

FieldDetail
DataName, date of birth, gender, emails, phones, addresses, usernames, company, job title
PurposeAuto-filling registration forms
Legal basisContract performance
RecipientsNone. Data injected into forms locally in the browser.
RetentionUntil profile or account deletion
SecurityEncrypted as a single AES-256-GCM blob with per-user key

5. Activity log

FieldDetail
DataAction type, detail text, timestamp
PurposeSecurity monitoring
Legal basisLegitimate interest (security)
Retention12 months

6. Trusted devices

FieldDetail
DataDevice name, IP address, platform, device ID, timestamps
PurposeNFC bridge management
Legal basisContract performance
RetentionUntil device removal or account deletion

7. Authentication tokens

FieldDetail
DataSHA-256 hash of token, prefix, creation date, last used date
PurposeSession management
SecurityRaw tokens never stored. Only hashes persisted.

Technical and organizational measures

  • All data encrypted at rest (AES-256-GCM with per-user keys)
  • All communications encrypted in transit (HTTPS with TLS certificate pinning)
  • Per-user data isolation at the database level
  • CSRF protection, rate limiting
  • Daily automated backups (30-day retention)
  • Server hosted by Infomaniak, Switzerland
  • No third-party analytics, tracking, or data sharing
Last updated: April 12, 2026
2
Data breach notification procedure
Art. 24 nLPD. Our step-by-step process for detecting, assessing, containing, and reporting data breaches.

1. Definition

A personal data breach is any security incident that leads to accidental or unlawful destruction, loss, alteration, unauthorized disclosure of, or access to personal data.

2. Detection

  • Unusual server access patterns
  • Unexpected database queries or exports
  • User reports of unauthorized activity
  • Security researcher disclosures
  • Monitoring alerts (failed authentication spikes, rate limiting triggers)

3. Assessment (within 24 hours)

  • What data was affected?
  • How many users are affected?
  • Is the data encrypted? Was the master key compromised?
  • Is the breach ongoing or contained?
  • What is the risk to affected users?

4. Containment (immediately)

  • Revoke all active authentication tokens
  • Rotate the master encryption key if compromised
  • Block unauthorized access vectors
  • Take the server offline if necessary
  • Preserve evidence

5. Notification to the FDPIC

As soon as possible (within 72 hours) via databreach.edoeb.admin.ch. The notification includes: nature of the breach, data affected, number of users, consequences, and measures taken.

6. Notification to affected users

Required if the breach poses a high risk to users. Users are notified via the management panel and any available contact information. The notification explains what happened, what data was affected, what the user should do, and what SkinID has done.

7. Post-incident review

Within 2 weeks: document the timeline, identify root cause, implement corrective measures, update procedures.

Contact

FDPIC: www.edoeb.admin.ch
Breach notification: databreach.edoeb.admin.ch

Last updated: April 12, 2026
3
Data Protection Impact Assessment
Art. 22 nLPD. An assessment of how SkinID processes personal data, what risks exist, and what measures mitigate those risks.

1. Description

SkinID is a Swiss authentication platform that uses a subdermal NFC cryptographic implant as a universal identity key. Users scan their hand to authenticate across digital and physical environments.

Data processed

  • NFC implant UID (SHA-256 hash)
  • Encrypted website credentials (passwords)
  • Encrypted FIDO2 private keys
  • Encrypted autofill profile (name, contacts, addresses)
  • Activity logs, device information, sharing relationships

Data flows

User's implant → NFC reader → SkinID app/extension → HTTPS → SkinID server (Switzerland). No data flows outside Switzerland. No third-party APIs receive user data.

2. Necessity and proportionality

Each data category serves a specific functional purpose (authentication, password management, form auto-fill). No email, phone, or real name is required. SkinID collects significantly less personal data than comparable services. Data collection is proportionate.

3. Risk assessment

RiskLikelihoodImpact
Server compromise (database only)LowLow (data encrypted)
Server compromise (database + master key)Very lowHigh
Stolen authentication tokenLowMedium
NFC implant cloning (DESFire EV3)Very lowMedium
Cross-user data accessVery lowHigh
Data lossLowMedium

4. Mitigation measures

MeasureStatus
AES-256-GCM encryption with per-user keysImplemented
Master key stored separately from databaseImplemented
SHA-256 token hashingImplemented
Auto-lock after inactivityImplemented
Per-user data isolationImplemented
Daily automated backupsImplemented
DESFire EV3 AES-128 mutual authenticationImplemented
Migrate to implant-derived encryption keysPlanned
Encrypt activity log entriesPlanned

5. Conclusion

The processing is necessary and proportionate. Identified risks are mitigated by technical and organizational measures. Residual risk level: LOW. The primary residual risk (server-side master key) is accepted for the current phase and will be addressed by migrating to implant-derived encryption keys.

This assessment is reviewed annually, when significant changes are made, or after any security incident.

Last updated: April 12, 2026